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Imagine a legal system where the allocation of the risk of an unauthor-
ized debit to a bank account was governed by a simple set of clear rules
that did not create different results depending upon the method for initiat-
ing the debit. Imagine that the legal rules operated to place incentives on
the account owner to safeguard information concerning debiting the ac-
count and incentives on the bank holding the account to offer security pro-
cedures to assist the account owner in protecting the account from
unauthorized access. This is certainly not the world we live in today. In-
stead, we live in a world where the risk-allocation rules for unauthorized
debits to an account operate differently depending upon the mechanism
used to access the account. Those risk-allocation rules do not create realis-
tic incentives on either the account owner or the bank holding the account
to safeguard against unauthorized debits in a reasonable manner.
The thesis of this article is that it is time to imagine a different way to
approach payment systems risk-allocation rules. Instead of being trapped in
the past by the way in which different payment systems evolved, it is time
to focus on the policies that should be fostered in the payment systems and
craft legal rules to advance those policies. Crafting the legal rules should
take into account operational realities so as to reduce costs and increase
certainty regarding risk allocation. This article will consider one set of
policies that may be useful to consider regarding risk allocation for unau-
thorized debits to a deposit account, that is, fraudulent payment inceptions.
To begin to understand the current payment systems in play, it is nec-
essary to start with a larger picture in order to place the individual pieces in
place. First, what is a payment system? At its most basic level, it is a sys-
tem that is used to transfer value from one person to another in order to pay
* Frederick N. and Barbara T. Curley Professor of Commercial Law, Gonzaga University
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for goods, services, real estate, or other desired items.I The value trans-
ferred is generally denominated in standard units as measured by some type
of currency, such as dollars or euros.2 A functioning payment system is a
necessary component of economic development. To facilitate the exchange
and creation of wealth, payment systems have to be systems of value trans-
fer that function reliably at a reasonable level of cost.3
Perhaps the most elementary payment system is physical transfer of
currency. To pay for desired commodities or services, a purchaser uses a
token, such as a dollar bill, that is deemed to have value by a government4
and the marketplace. 5 Typically, using currency in this fashion requires
physical transfer of the token to another person. In a world where many
transactions are not face-to-face and the amounts being transferred are
large, physical transfer of large numbers of tokens is not feasible. Thus the
modem commercial world has developed alternative mechanisms for mak-
ing payments.
Payment mechanisms currently in use depend on a system of banking.
A person will deposit currency or currency equivalents with a bank and the
bank will acknowledge through private agreement with the depositor that
the bank owes an obligation to pay demands against that deposit up to the
available amount of credit, thus creating a "deposit account." Although that
term brings up a mental image of a stash of currency in a vault somewhere
at the bank with the depositor's name on it, a deposit account is really just
an unsecured debt that the bank owes the depositor.6
Demands on the credits the bank owes the depositor come in two basic
forms. The depositor may order the bank to transfer credits to another-a
1. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON
PAYMENTS SYSTEM RISK 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON PAYMENTS SYSTEM
RISK], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/psr/policyO7.pdf, FRED H. MILLER
& ALVIN C. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MODERN PAYMENT SYSTEMS 1 1.01 (2003).
2. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-104(a) (2005) (negotiable instrument must state a "fixed amount of
money"), 4-104(a)(9) (item is a promise or order "to pay money"), 4A-103(a)(l) (payment order must
state a "fixed or determinable amount of money"), 1-201(b)(24) (definition of money).
3. See Policy Statement-The Federal Reserve in the Payments System, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,648, at
11,649 (Mar. 29, 1990); COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYS., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS
(BIS), CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT SYSTEMS § 1.1 (2001) [hereinafter
BIS], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss43.pdf.
4. Currency and coinage issued by the United States is deemed to be legal tender and is required
to be accepted in payment of debts, public and private. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2000). See Task Force on
Stored Value Cards, A Commercial Lawyer's Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Commercial
Law Issues Associated With Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 BUS. LAW. 653, 666 (1997).
5. See generally SAM Y. CROSS, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., ALL ABOUT... THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES (1998), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/educa
tion/addpubiusfxm/.
6. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 1100, 1107-
08 (10th Cir. 2004).
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credit transfer (also known as a push transaction). The depositor makes the
order that in essence pushes credits from the bank that is "holding" the
deposit toward a designated payee. The second method is that a payee, not
the depositor, orders the bank that is "holding" the deposit to transfer those
credits to the payee-a debit transfer (also known as a pull transaction).
The payee "pulls" the credits from the depositor's bank to the payee. 7
Mechanisms for making these push or pull transactions by giving or-
ders to the bank holding the depositor's credits are as ancient as a draft
(which is called a "check" when drawn on a bank)8 and as modem as an
electronic transfer of information from the depositor's bank to the payee's
bank over secure computer networks. 9 A check is a debit (pull) transfer; in
other words, it is the depositor's (drawer's) order to the drawee bank to pay
the designated payee that the payee (or a bank acting on behalf of the
payee) presents to the drawee bank.10
Now consider a more modem payment mechanism for ordering pay-
ment from a bank account: electronic bill-paying interfaces. These inter-
faces can be either credit or debit transactions. A credit transaction is
illustrated by the depositor accessing its bank's website and using a com-
puterized instruction interface to order that bank to make payment to the
designated payee using credits from the depositor's bank account.1' A debit
transaction is illustrated by the depositor visiting a payee's website and,
through a computerized instruction to the payee, authorizing the payee to
pull credits from the depositor's bank account to the payee's bank ac-
count. 12 The depositor or payee does not have to initiate the credit or debit
transaction each time a payment is due. A depositor may sign a written
authorization allowing a payee to pull funds from the depositor's account
7. See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note; James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Alloca-
tion for Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453, 456-57 (2004).
8. U.C.C. § 3-104(f).
9. This is the type of system described in the prefatory note to U.C.C. Article 4A.
10. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(8) (definition of order), 3-103(a)(5) (definition of drawer), 3-104(e) (draft
as an order to pay), 3-501 (presentment), 3-502(b) (dishonor), 4-104(a)(8) (definition of drawee), 4-
105(3) (definition of payor bank), 4-201 (collecting bank as agent for owner of item). Even with the
depositor's instruction (the check), the drawee bank is not obligated to the payee to transfer any value to
the payee. Id. § 3-408. The drawee bank's refusal to pay a payee as ordered by the drawer may give the
drawer a cause of action against the drawee bank for wrongful dishonor based upon breach of the
deposit agreement between the drawee and drawer. Id. § 4-402. In U.C.C. Article 4 terminology, the
drawee bank is the payor bank, id. § 4-105(3), and the drawer is the customer of the payor bank, id. § 4-
104(a)(5).
11. See also Nancy Feig, Bank of America Achieves Highest Adoption of Online Bill Pay Among
Leading Banks, FINANCETECH, Mar. 6, 2007, http://www.financetech.com/showArticle.jhtml?article
ID=197800476 (discussing the prevalence of online bill payment services).
12. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681, 687-
88 (2004).
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automatically at certain time intervals. A depositor may also sign a written
authorization allowing its bank to push payments to payees at designated
intervals. Reoccurring payments, such as mortgages or insurance premi-
ums, may be handled in this more automated way. 13 A depositor may also
use an access mechanism such as a debit card to instruct its bank to transfer
credits to a payee at the point of sale. This is common in retail sales of
merchandise. 14
The legal rules that govern the various methods of instructing the de-
positor's bank to move credits to payees have evolved over time and differ
significantly depending in large part on the method of giving the instruction
to the bank holding the account. Thus the rules governing checks are sig-
nificantly different than the rules governing electronic credit or debit trans-
actions. Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Articles 3 and 4 will govern
checks drawn on the payor (depositor's) bank, but not the payor's instruc-
tions made in some other manner to move value from its bank to a payee. 15
Many transactions in which the payor's instruction to its bank is made
through some mechanism other than a check are governed by U.C.C. Arti-
cle 4A, or funds-transfer system rules, such as those promulgated for the
Automated Clearing House network (ACH). 16 Some debit transactions
(instructions given by a payee through a mechanism other than a check) are
not governed by the U.C.C. at all. Rather, many debit transactions are gov-
erned by common law contract, property, and tort principles, as there is not
a body of codified law that uniformly applies. 17 If a debit transaction is
13. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b) (2007).
14. See, e.g., PAYMENT SYS. POLICY ADVISORY COMM., FED. RESERVE BD., A SUMMARY OF THE
ATLANTA FORUM ON TRANSFORMING U.S. RETAIL PAYMENTS (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/transformretail/transformretail.pdf. For a comparison of
echecks and debit cards, see eCheck, Comparison with Other Payment Instruments: Debit Cards,
http://www.echeck.org/overview/comparison/debitcard.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
15. See U.C.C. §§ 3-102(a) (Article 3 applies to negotiable instruments), 3-104 (check as a nego-
tiable instrument), 4-102 (Article 4 applies to items), 4-104(a)(9) (definition of item includes instru-
ment); Stephanie Heller, An Endangered Species: The Increasing Irrelevance ofArticle 4 of the UCC in
an Electronics-Based Payments System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 514-16 (2006) (explaining the
limitation of Articles 3 and 4 to "writings"). Some uncertainty currently exists in determining applica-
tion of the rules in some circumstances when a check is involved in starting the payment instruction but
at some point during that process the paper check is no longer being used, rather the instruction is being
carried out based upon information derived from the paper check. See infra text accompanying notes
103-10.
16. U.C.C. §§ 4A-102 (application to funds transfers), 4A-104 (definition of funds transfers), 4A-
104 cmt. 4 (application to credit transfers only); NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 2007
ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 ACH RULES]. See infra notes 163-82 and accompanying text on the ACH
rules that are promulgated by NACHA. More information about NACHA may be obtained at
http://www.nacha.org/About/default.htm.
17. See 3 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-2, at 3-4,
11-15 (West Pub. Co., Practitioner Treatise Series, 4th ed. 1995).
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made through a network such as ACH, funds-transfer system rules will
apply.' 8
The identity of the payor will also determine what legal rules apply in
the event of an electronic credit or debit transaction. If the payor is a con-
sumer and the deposit account is held primarily for family, personal, or
household purposes of the consumer, a different set of legal rules will apply
than if the deposit account is not held for such purposes. 19 The federal
Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA) 20 and Regulation E21 will govern
some, but not all, aspects of the relationship between the consumer and the
depositary bank. Those federal rules are primarily focused on some princi-
ples of consumer protection, as opposed to a wholesale regulation of the
funds transfer from start to finish.22
In thinking about deposit accounts, one can easily imagine the various
types of risk involved in this arrangement for making payments, no matter
what mechanism is used to initiate the payment. First, there is always a
credit risk. Credit risk refers to the risk that the depositor may not have
available value in the deposit account to cover the instruction to push or
pull value from the account. 23 The payee takes that credit risk if it parts
with its value before the payment transaction is complete. The depositary
bank takes that risk if it honors the payment push or pull even if the value
of credits allocated to the deposit account is insufficient. Second, there may
be some risk of intermediary failure in any payment transaction utilizing
the banking system. This risk occurs when the depositary bank, intermedi-
ary bank, or non-bank intermediary fails or is unable to complete the pay-
ment transaction due to failure of its processing system. 24 Who bears that
risk in any payment transaction will depend upon the mechanism used to
18. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 16.
19. 12 C.F.R. §§ 205.3 (scope of Regulation E), 205.2(b) (definition of account), 205.2(e) (defini-
tion of consumer) (2007).
20. Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title XX, 92 Stat. 3641, 3728 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1693-1693r (2000)).
21. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205.
22. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.1(b).
23. See FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON PAYMENTS SYSTEM RISK, supra note 1, at 3. The Federal
Reserve distinguishes credit risk (failure of settlement when due and thereafter) from liquidity risk
(failure to pay when due). Id.
24. Id. The Federal Reserve lumps both intermediary failure risk and fraud risk into a larger
category it denominates "operational risk," that is, "risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people, and systems, or from external events. This type of risk includes various
physical and information security risks." Id.
2008]
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initiate the payment. 25 Another article in this symposium considers the risk
of intermediary failure. 26
A third risk, closely related to intermediary failure, is the risk that mis-
takes will be made in the payments processing system. Typical types of
mistakes are (i) mistakes in identifying the correct depositary account, the
correct payee account, or the correct payee, or (ii) errors in the amount of
the value transfer or the timing of the value transfer.27 Again, other articles
in this symposium consider those types of risks. 28
A fourth risk in any payment system is the risk that the costs of oper-
ating the system using any particular mechanism make the system unattrac-
tive as a method for making payments. 29 Costs of operating a system
include not only direct costs of equipment, personnel, and infrastructure for
processing, but also many types of indirect costs. These indirect costs in-
clude the costs of obtaining cooperation between the players in the system
so that the system functions, costs of reallocating the losses that inevitably
will happen in any payment system, and costs of educating the users re-
garding the system. The direct and indirect costs of any payment system are
ultimately born by all of the players in the system.30 How these costs are
spread among the players is often not transparent or obvious.
Finally, there is a fraud risk in any payment system. One type of fraud
risk exists when the purported payor does not actually have the right to
push value from the account in a particular transaction or where the payee
does not actually have the right to pull value from the account. 31 Typically,
the wrongdoer that fraudulently initiates the order to debit the payor's ac-
count cannot be found or does not have sufficient value available to make
the purported payor whole. If recovery is unavailable for some reason
against the wrongdoer, then one of the parties to the payment transaction
will bear that risk, even if that party acted innocently and with all due care.
The risk of this type of fraud could rest on the payee, the payee's bank, the
25. See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (2005) (discussion of insolvency losses).
26. See James Stevens Rogers, Unification of Payments Law and the Problem of Insolvency Risk
in Payment Systems, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 689 (2008).
27. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 4-209 (encoding errors), 4A-205 (late or erroneous execution of payment
order), 4A-207 (misdescription of beneficiary), 4A-208 (misdescription of bank); Richard F. Dole, Jr.,
Receiving Bank Liability for Errors in Wholesale Wire Transfers, 69 TUL. L. REv. 877 (1995).
28. See Sarah Jane Hughes, Duty Issues in the Ever-Changing World of Payments Processing: Is
it Time for New Rules?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 721 (2008); Anita Ramasastry, Confusion and Conver-
gence in Consumer Payments: Is Coherence in Error Resolution Appropriate?, 83 CM-KENT L. REV.
813 (2008).
29. See BIS, supra note 3, § 2.4.
30. See id. §§ 3.8.1-.8.6, 7.8.6-.8.13.
31. See generally A. Brooke Overby, Check Fraud in the Courts After the Revisions to UC.C.
Articles 3 and 4, 57 ALA. L. REv. 351 (2005).
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purported payor, or the payor bank. Where that risk ultimately resides de-
pends upon a complicated set of payment rules that further depend on the
status of the purported payor, the mechanism used to initiate payment, the
method used to process the payment, and the means by which the fraud was
perpetrated.
It is that risk of fraud in the inception of the payment process that is
the subject of this article. Part I of this article will set forth the current risk-
allocation rules for unauthorized debits from a bank account, regardless of
whether the transaction is a push or pull transfer. Part II will explore possi-
ble principles for guiding risk allocation and factors that may influence the
choice of one or more of those principles as the basis for a more simplified
set of rules for risk allocation. In doing so, possible draft rules will be pro-
posed and discussed. Part II will also evaluate the attractiveness of the pos-
sible draft rules in any payments reform effort in light of operational
realities. The purpose of this evaluation is to demonstrate that payments
rules may be crafted from a policy perspective in a functional manner and
need not be based on the manner in which the instruction is made to the
payor bank.
I. ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT INCEPTION
UNDER CURRENT LAW
This section briefly explains how the current legal rules allocate the
risk of unauthorized debits from a deposit account by first considering the
rules regarding checks. After a review of the check mechanism, this section
will explore push and pull payment orders other than checks.
A. Checks
U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 provide the main source of legal rules for al-
locating the risk of an unauthorized debit from a deposit account using a
check. This discussion will assume the traditional paradigm of the check as
a paper instrument that the purported payor issues to the payee and the
payee presents to the payor bank for payment. After that discussion, the
legal rules that may apply if the check is not processed all the way through
to the payor bank in its original paper format will be addressed.
To flesh out a basic understanding of the allocation of risk for unau-
thorized checks, a simple scenario is discussed below. In the first example,
there is no unauthorized issuance of the check. In the second example,
there is an unauthorized issuance of the check. In that discussion, what
counts as "unauthorized" is also considered.
20081
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1. Example 1: Authorized Issuance
Davis (the payor) has a deposit account at First Bank (the payor bank).
Davis signed a check drawn on First Bank and issued to Phil (the payee).
Phil deposits the check to his account at National Bank (the payee's bank).
National Bank presents the check to First Bank for payment. First Bank
pays the value for the check to National Bank, and National Bank gives
Phil a credit for that amount to Phil's bank account. First Bank deducts the
amount of the check from Davis's deposit account at First Bank.
In U.C.C. Article 3 terminology, the person that issues a check to a
payee is the drawer (the payor).32 By signing the check, Davis, the drawer,
is ordering the drawee (the payor bank, First Bank) to make payment of the
amount of the check to the payee designated on the check, in this case,
Phil.33 National Bank (the payee's bank) is acting as Phil's agent in collect-
ing the amount of the check from First Bank.34
Davis's signature on the check also creates an obligation of Davis to
pay the amount of the check to Phil in the event First Bank dishonors the
check.35 Davis's issuance of the check to Phil, without more, does not cre-
ate any enforceable right of Phil to compel First Bank to honor the check or
to pay value to Phil.36 If First Bank dishonors the check when National
Bank presents the check, then National Bank will charge back the amount
of the dishonored check against Phil's account with National Bank.37 Phil
will then have to rely on his right to enforce Davis's liability as a drawer on
the check through a lawsuit in the event Davis does not pay voluntarily. 38
In that lawsuit, Davis may have defenses to payment that he could assert
against Phil.3
9
32. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(5).
33. Id. §§ 3-103(a)(8) (definition of order), 3-109 (payable to order or bearer).
34. Id. § 4-201.
35. Id. § 3-414. This liability is often referred to as contract liability on the draft. See Barry L.
Zaretsky, Contract Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments, 42 ALA. L. REV. 627 (1991).
36. U.C.C. § 3-408. This statement is true as long as the drawee has not "accepted" the check.
Acceptance of the check is the drawee's signed engagement on the check to pay it. A certified check is
an example of an "accepted" check. Id. § 3-409. If the drawee has signed the check, thus creating an
"accepted" check, the drawee will then have an obligation to pay the check. Id. § 3-413.
37. Id. § 4-214.
38. Id § 3-414.
39. A drawer obligated on the check will be presumptively liable unless it raises a defense to
payment when it is sued based upon the drawer's liability under U.C.C. section 3-414. Id. § 3-308. The
type of defenses that may be asserted are provided for in U.C.C. section 3-305. Some typical defenses
may be that the value given for issuance of the check was not actually provided, the drawer did not sign
or authorize the signing of the check, the check has already been paid, or the check has been altered.
See id. § 3-305 cmts. 1-2. Whether those defenses will be successful depends in part on whether the
person seeking to enforce the drawer's liability is a holder in due course that has taken free of that
[Vol 83:2
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If First Bank honors the check, First Bank will pay the amount of the
check to National Bank. This payment often takes place by crediting an
account of National Bank with First Bank or debiting an account of First
Bank at National Bank.40 First Bank will deduct the amount of the value of
the check from the deposit account of Davis.41 First Bank has a right to
deduct the value of the check from the deposit account of Davis if the
check is "properly payable" from the account. A check is properly payable
if "it is authorized by the customer and is in accordance with any agree-
ment between the customer and bank. '42 The drawer of the check (the
payor) is the "customer" of the drawee (the payor bank) on which the check
is drawn.43 Generally, if the drawer has signed the check or authorized the
drawer's signature on the check and the payee receives the value from the
check, the check is properly payable from the drawer's account with the
drawee bank.4
4
Now consider how the rules work when the person who signs the
check as the drawer is not authorized to sign the check.
2. Example 2: Unauthorized Issuance
Davis has a deposit account at First Bank. Francis (the wrongdoer)
signed a check drawn on Davis's account at First Bank and gave that check
to Phil. Davis has not authorized Francis to draw any checks on his account
at First Bank. Francis obtained a check blank from Davis by stealing
Davis's checkbook. Phil deposits the check to his account at National
Bank. National Bank presents the check to First Bank for payment. First
Bank pays the amount of the check to National Bank and National Bank
gives Phil a credit for that amount to Phil's bank account. First Bank de-
ducts the amount of the check from Davis's deposit account at First Bank.
defense. Id. §§ 3-302 (requirements of a holder in due course), 3-305(b) (holder in due course not
subject to certain types of defenses).
40. Id. §§ 4-301 (payor bank provisional settlement), 4-215 (payor bank final payment), 4-213
(types of settlements).
41. Id. § 4-401.
42. Id. § 4-401(a).
43. Id. § 4-104(a)(5).
44. See 7 LARY LAWRENCE, LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-
401:5 (rev. 3d ed. 2000). Typically, the bank-customer agreement will provide that the drawee bank is
authorized to charge the drawer's deposit account whenever the drawer signed the check or authorized
the drawer's signature on the check. But see Paul S. Turner, Contracting Out of the UCC: Variation by
Agreement Under Articles 3. 4, and 4A, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 443, 448-50 (2006) (describing bank-
customer agreements that shift the responsibility for unauthorized checks to the drawer); see also
Gregory E. Maggs, A Complaint About Payment Law Under the U.C.C.: What You See Is Often Not
What You Get, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 203-06 (2007).
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Francis's signature on the check creates an obligation of Francis, not
Davis, to pay the amount of the check to Phil in the event First Bank dis-
honors the check.45 If First Bank dishonors the check when National Bank
presents the check, then National Bank will charge back the amount of the
dishonored check as against Phil's account with National Bank.46 Phil will
then have to rely on his right to enforce Francis's liability as a drawer on
the check through a lawsuit in the event Francis does not pay voluntarily.
In that lawsuit, Francis may have defenses to payment that could be as-
serted against Phil.47 If Phil tries to sue Davis on the drawer's contract
obligation on the check, which may happen if Francis has signed Davis's
name on the check, Davis has a viable defense to payment because it is not
his authorized signature.48 This defense can be asserted against Phil (or
National Bank) even if one or the other qualifies as a holder in due course
of the check. 49
If First Bank honors the check with the unauthorized drawer's signa-
ture, First Bank has no right to charge Davis's deposit account with First
Bank as the check is not "properly payable" from the account. 50 The check
did not authorize payment to Phil from Davis's account because Francis
was not authorized to issue the check drawn on Davis's account. Thus
Davis will be able to successfully require that First Bank recredit his ac-
count for the value previously deducted from the account. First Bank will
then seek to recover the value for the check from National Bank or Phil.
Unless one of a variety of exceptions applies, First Bank will not be
able to recover the value of the check from either National Bank or Phil
once First Bank has made "final payment" on the check. First Bank has
made final payment on the check if it makes a provisional settlement for
the check with National Bank by midnight of the banking day of receipt
45. U.C.C. §§ 3-403 (liability of unauthorized signor), 3-414 (drawer's liability).
46. Id. § 4-214.
47. Seesupra note 39.
48. U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 3-403. To place the validity of the drawer's signature in issue, Davis must
specifically deny that it was his signature in the pleadings when action is brought to enforce the
drawer's liability. In that circumstance, the person seeking to enforce the drawer's liability on the check
would have to prove that the signature was valid or that the drawer should be held liable on the check.
Id. § 3-308(a).
49. A holder in due course is entitled to enforce the "drawer's" obligation on the instrument free
from most defenses to payment. Id. §§ 3-414, 3-305. Whether a signature is authorized determines who
is the "drawer" of the check. That is why Article 3 provides that a person is not liable on the instrument
unless that person signed the instrument or is responsible for the signature, id. § 3-401, and that the
signature of an unauthorized signor operates to bind the unauthorized signor, not the person whose
name was signed. Id. § 3-403.
50. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1.
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and fails to timely return the check by its midnight deadline.5 1 First Bank
generally will make a provisional settlement with National Bank for the
amount of the check when National Bank presents the check to First Bank.
The midnight deadline is midnight of the banking day following the bank-
ing day that First Bank received the check.52 Because the authorized
drawer (Davis) may not discover for some time that an unauthorized check
was drawn on the account, and thus may not raise the argument that the
check was not properly payable until well beyond the drawee bank's (First
Bank's) midnight deadline, First Bank will bear the loss, as it will not be
able to rightfully return the check to National Bank or Phil before expira-
tion of its midnight deadline.
53
3. Authorized by the Drawer
When is a check authorized by the drawer? First and foremost, a check
is authorized by the drawer if the drawer signed the check that orders pay-
ment to the payee, and the payee (or the payee's designee) is the one re-
ceiving the value from the drawee. 54 Second, the check is authorized by the
drawer if the drawer authorized another person to draw the check on the
drawer's deposit account payable to the payee and the payee (or the
payee's designee) receives the value. The drawer's authorization is created
51. Id. §§ 4-301 (ability to revoke a provisional settlement), 4-215 (when final payment has been
made). Return of a check happens when the drawee bank "sends" the check. Sending means to deliver
the check for transmission with the costs of transmission provided for. Id. § 1-201(b)(36). Thus, to
comply with the midnight deadline, the drawee bank must get the check to the means of transmission by
that deadline, but is not required to ensure that the bank to which the check is sent actually receives the
check.
52. Id. § 4-104(a)(10). In some circumstances, the midnight deadline may be extended if the
drawee bank has used a very expeditious means of returning the check so that it would arrive at the
bank to which it was returned in the same time frame it would have arrived if the drawee bank had met
the midnight deadline. 12 C.F.R. § 229.30(c) (2007).
53. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text on the typical inability of the payor bank to pass
the loss from a check with a forged drawer's signature back to the payee's bank.
54. U.C.C. §§ 3-401, 4-401 cmt. 1. The payee's designee is the person to whom the payee has
delivered the check for collection (such as a depositary bank) or the person whom the payee has desig-
nated should receive payment, such as a transferee. If the payee's necessary indorsement is forged, the
payee has not designated anyone to receive payment on the check. A payee's indorsement is "neces-
sary" when the check is payable to the named payee and in order to further negotiate the check, the
payee must indorse the instrument. Id. § 3-205. Thus, the first comment to U.C.C. section 4-401 states
that items that contain forged indorsements are not properly payable. When the payee's necessary
indorsement is forged, the loss is generally passed back to the bank in which the check was deposited
based upon breach of a presentment warranty. Id. § 3-417(a)(1) (warranty that prior transferor was
entitled to enforce). If a check is payable to the named payee, only the named payee is "entitled to
enforce" the check until the payee indorses the check or voluntarily transfers the check to another. Id.
§§ 3-301 (entitled to enforce), 3-203 (transfer of instrument), 1-201(b)(21) (definition of holder). If the
payee's necessary indorsement is forged and the check is paid through the bank collection process, the
payee will have a cause of action for conversion against the depositary bank or other persons who took
the check after the forged indorsement. Id. § 3-420.
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according to normal rules of agency law, including apparent authority. 55
Third, the check is authorized by the drawer if the drawer and the drawee
bank agree by contract to alter the usual rules of authorization stated
above.56 For example, in a positive pay agreement the drawee and the
drawer agree that the drawee will honor all checks identified on a list pro-
vided by the drawer, regardless of whether the check is in fact signed or
authorized by the drawer under agency principles. The identification of the
checks on the list is often by check number and amount. 57 The following
discussion assumes that the purported drawer's signature on the check is in
fact unauthorized.
4. Exceptions to the Allocation of Risk of Unauthorized Drawer's
Signature to the Drawee Bank
As referred to above, there are numerous exceptions to the general
rule that allocates the risk of an unauthorized drawer's signature to the
drawee bank that has made final payment on the check. In some circum-
stances, the risk will be allocated to the purported drawer; in other circum-
stances, the risk will be allocated to the payee or the payee's bank.
a. Risk on the Purported Drawer
First, consider how the risk of an unauthorized drawer's signature may
be allocated to the purported drawer. As discussed above, the drawee bank
may only charge the drawer's account for an item that is properly payable.
A check with a forged drawer's signature is not properly payable. 58 If the
drawer seeks to obtain a recredit to its account based upon an argument that
the check with the forged drawer's signature is not properly payable, the
drawee bank may counter with an argument that the purported drawer was
negligent and that negligence substantially contributed to the making of the
forgery of the drawer's signature on the check, thus precluding the pur-
55. Id. § 3-402(a).
56. The extent to which the bank-customer agreement in fact changes the allocation of the risk of
an unauthorized signature to the customer may be unclear, such as in the case of a facsimile signature.
See Lor-Mar/Toto, Inc. v. 1st Constitution Bank, 871 A.2d 110 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005);
Turner, supra note 44, at 449-52.
57. See Subcomm. on Payments, Am. Bar Ass'n, Deterring Check Fraud: The Model Positive Pay
Services Agreement and Commentary, 54 BUS. LAW. 637, 644-45 (1999).
58. See supra notes 42 & 50 and accompanying text. In any of the situations discussed in the text
where the drawee/payor bank is able to allocate the risk of the forged drawer's signature to the drawer,
the drawer may want to sue the wrongdoer or those parties that took the check from the wrongdoer.
Whether the drawer has a cause of action in this situation is very uncertain. See Philip E. Cleary, Statu-
tory Overkill: Why Section 3-420(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code May Not Really Mean What It
Says About the Issuer's Cause of Action for Conversion of a Negotiable Instrument, 39 UCC L.J. 399
(2007).
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ported drawer from asserting that forgery against the drawee bank. 59 Thus,
in Example 2 discussed above, First Bank would try to demonstrate that
Davis was negligent and his negligence substantially contributed to Francis
forging Davis's signature on the check. If First Bank was successful in that
argument, then Davis would argue that First Bank was also negligent in
paying the check and that First Bank's negligence substantially contributed
to the loss. In that event, the loss is shared between Davis and First Bank
based upon the relative degree of negligence of the parties.60 Unfortunately
for Davis, however, he will often be unable to assert that First Bank's neg-
ligence consisted of the failure to examine the drawer's signature on the
check. Under U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4, a drawee bank is not lacking ordi-
nary care if it pays a check without examination of the signature, as long as
the bank follows its prescribed procedures and those procedures "do not
vary unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved by [Arti-
cles 3 or 4]."61 In Example 2, Davis might be negligent in the circum-
stances that allowed Francis access to the check blank, and that negligence
may be sufficient to preclude Davis from asserting the forgery of his signa-
ture on the check against First Bank.
Davis may also be precluded from asserting against First Bank the
forgery of his signature on the check if First Bank makes available a state-
ment showing payments made from the deposit account, and Davis fails to
examine the statement and notify First Bank of the unauthorized check in a
timely manner. 62 This "bank statement rule" has three separate and distinct
aspects.
First, if Davis fails to report the unauthorized check within a reason-
able time after the statement is made available to him, and First Bank
proves it suffered a loss by virtue of Davis's failure to examine and to re-
port the problem promptly to First Bank, Davis is precluded from asserting
the unauthorized signature against First Bank in the action to get First Bank
59. U.C.C. § 3-406(a). The negligence based preclusion in section 3-406 applies to a forgery of
the drawer's signature. A forgery is just one of the ways in which a drawer's signature may be unau-
thorized. See id. §§ 1-201(b)(41), 3-406 cmt. 2.
60. See id. § 3-406(b). That subsection provides:
[l]f the person asserting the preclusion fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the
instrument and that failure substantially contributes to loss, the loss is allocated between the
person precluded and the person asserting the preclusion according to the extent to which the
failure of each to exercise ordinary care contributed to the loss.
61. Id. § 3-103(a)(9); see, e.g., Union Planters Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Rogers, 912 So.2d 116, 123-
24 (Miss. 2005); Mark E. Budnitz, The Consequences of Bulk in Our Banking Diet: Bulk Filing of
Checks and the Bank's Duty of Ordinary Care Under the 1990 Revision to the Uniform Commercial
Code When it Honors Forged Checks, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 729, 776-77 (1990).
62. U.C.C. § 4-406(c).
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to recredit the account pursuant to the properly payable rule.63 This rule
will allocate the risk to Davis generally only if First Bank can demonstrate
that the time lag in reporting prevented successful recovery of the amount
of the check from the wrongdoer.
64
Second, if Davis fails to report an initial unauthorized check in a
timely manner after a statement is made available and the same wrongdoer
obtains payment on a second unauthorized check after Davis had a reason-
able time (not to exceed thirty days after the account statement was made
available to Davis) to report the first unauthorized check, Davis is pre-
cluded from asserting the forgery on the second unauthorized check.
65
In both of those circumstances, Davis has a slim opportunity to split
the loss with First Bank using comparative negligence principles if Davis
can prove that First Bank failed to use ordinary care in paying the item and
that failure substantially contributed to the loss.66 This argument suffers
from the same difficulty in showing First Bank failed to use ordinary care,
as considered previously. Generally, First Bank's payment of the check
using automated means or its failure to examine the signature will not show
a lack of ordinary care.67 In both situations described above, Davis may
also attempt to show that First Bank failed to pay the item in good faith in
order to preclude First Bank from using either rule to preclude Davis's
assertion of the forged drawer's signature. 68 This is not an easy standard for
Davis to meet, even though the standard of good faith includes honesty in
fact and the exercise of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
69
Finally, the bank statement rule has a third aspect. Regardless of the
lack of care of either the drawee bank or the purported drawer, the pur-
ported drawer is precluded from asserting the forged drawer's signature
against the drawee bank if the purported drawer does not discover or report
the unauthorized signature within one year after the statement of account is
made available to the purported drawer. 70 Courts have upheld the drawee
bank's shortening of this time period in the bank-customer agreement.
71
63. Id. § 4-406(d)(1).
64. Id.; see LAWRENCE, supra note 44, § 4-406:18.
65. See U.C.C. § 4-406(d)(2).
66. See id. § 4-406(e).
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
68. See U.C.C. section 4-406(e) which provides in relevant part: "If the customer proves that the
bank did not pay the item in good faith, the preclusion under subsection (d) does not apply."
69. See id. §§ 3-103(a)(6), 4-104(c), 1-201(b)(20).
70. Id. § 4-406(0.
71. See, e.g., Nat'l Title Ins. Corp. Agency v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 559 S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va.
2002) (sixty days); Am. Airlines Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Martin, 29 S.W.3d 86, 97-98 (Tex.
2000) (same); Stowell v. Cloquet Co-op Credit Union, 557 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Minn. 1997) (twenty days
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The drawee bank has one more argument to assert against the pur-
ported drawer to preclude that person from asserting the drawer's signature
was unauthorized when the purported drawer makes the argument that the
check was not properly payable. If the purported drawer ratifies an other-
wise unauthorized drawer's signature, the purported drawer will be pre-
cluded from asserting that the check was not properly payable.
72
Ratification is a "retroactive adoption of the unauthorized signature by the
person whose name is signed" and is effective for all purposes except as for
allocation of liability as between the unauthorized signor and the purported
drawer.73
b. Risk Allocated to the Payee or Payee's Bank
First Bank (the drawee bank), if unable to reallocate the loss on the
unauthorized check to Davis (the purported drawer) through the mecha-
nisms described above, will seek to transfer the loss "upstream" to the
payee's bank or the payee. 74 Once final payment has taken place on the
unauthorized check, the drawee bank has a very limited ability to attempt to
collect from the entity that presented the check or prior transferors of the
check. The drawee bank may assert a right to restitution, a breach of a pre-
sentment warranty, or that the payee's bank or the payee was part of a
scheme to defraud the drawee bank.
Using the facts from Example 2 described above, First Bank (the
drawee bank) has the ability to seek restitution from National Bank (the
payee's bank) when First Bank pays the check based upon the unauthorized
signature, even if First Bank has not exercised ordinary care.75 Unfortu-
nately for First Bank, however, National Bank will usually be able to have
a complete defense to the restitution argument if National Bank took the
check in good faith and for value from Phil, the payee. 76 Typically, Na-
tional Bank will have acted in good faith in taking the check for deposit
from Phil and will have given Phil value in the form of credit to Phil's ac-
count. 77 Restitution is thus not often a fruitful loss reallocation mechanism
for drawee banks that have paid a check with an unauthorized drawer's
from mailing statement); cf Regatos v. N. Fork Bank, 838 N.E.2d 629, 633 (N.Y. 2005) (bank-
customer agreement could not shorten the one year time period in U.C.C. section 4A-505).
72. U.C.C. § 3-403(a).
73. Id. § 3-403 cmt. 3.
74. Under the bank-customer agreement between National Bank (the payee's bank) and Phil (the
payee), National Bank will undoubtedly have recourse against Phil if National Bank has to pay the
drawee bank, First Bank. See id. §§ 4-214, 4-103.
75. Seeid. § 3-418(a).
76. See id. § 3-418(c).
77. See id § 3-303 (definition of value).
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signature given this protection of a good faith taker of the check who has
given value for the check.78
First Bank may attempt to assert breach of a presentment warranty by
National Bank and Phil. A person obtaining payment of a check (the pre-
senting bank, National Bank) and each prior transferor (Phil) warrant to the
drawee that has paid an item (First Bank) that the warrantor has "no knowl-
edge that the signature of the purported drawer of the draft is unauthor-
ized."' 79 Knowledge means "actual knowledge" and does not mean "reason
to know" based upon known facts and circumstances. 80 In most situations,
the payee will not know that the drawer's signature was not authorized and
neither will the presenting bank. 81 Thus this presentment warranty is also
not usually a promising avenue of recovery for the drawee bank. Even if
the payee or presenting bank knew that the drawer's signature was unau-
thorized, the drawee bank will be unable to recover on the presentment
warranty if the drawee bank should have asserted the one-year preclusion
against the purported drawer under the bank statement rule as discussed
earlier.82
Amendments to Regulation CC provide for a new presentment war-
ranty made to a drawee bank that pays a particular type of check that that
check is in fact authorized by the drawer. 83 The type of check to which this
new warranty applies is a "remotely created check." A remotely created
78. Persons protected from restitution are those that took the check in "good faith and for value"
or changed position in good faith reliance on the payment. Id. § 3-418(c); see 6 WILLIAM D.
HAWKLAND & LARY LAWRENCE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES: REVISED ARTICLE 3
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS § 3-418:5 [Rev] (Supp. 2007).
79. U.C.C. § 4-208(a)(3); cf § 3-417(a)(3).
80. Id. § 1-202(b).
81. See Overby, supra note 31, at 363.
82. U.C.C. § 4-406(f); see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text. Similarly, U.C.C. section 4-
208(c) provides that if the drawee bank asserts a claim for breach of a presentment warranty based upon
an alteration or an unauthorized indorsement, the drawee bank cannot recover on the presentment
warranty if it should have asserted either the negligence preclusion in U.C.C. section 3-406 or the
preclusion in U.C.C. section 4-406 (bank statement rule). Interestingly, U.C.C. section 4-208(c) does
not preclude the drawee bank from asserting a breach of presentment warranty based upon an unauthor-
ized drawer's signature if the drawer would be precluded from asserting the lack of authorization under
either U.C.C. section 3-406 or section 4-406.
83. See Collection of Checks and Other Items by Federal Reserve Banks, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,218
(Nov. 28, 2005) (effective July 1, 2006) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 229.34(d) (2007)). This change was
made after the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute promulgated amendments to Articles 3 and 4 providing for a new presentment warranty that
the drawer's signature was actually authorized on a remotely created consumer check that the drawee
bank paid when presented. U.C.C. §§ 3-417(a)(4), 4-208(a)(ii)(4). A remotely created consumer item is
defined as "an item drawn on a consumer account, which is not created by the payor bank and does not
bear a handwritten signature purporting to be the signature of the drawer." Id. § 3-103(a)(16). A con-
sumer account is an "account established by an individual primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes." Id. § 3-103(a)(2).
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check is a check that "is not created by the [drawee] bank and that does not
bear a signature applied, or purported to be applied, by the person on whose
account the check is drawn." 84 While ambiguities abound with this defini-
tion, the idea of the section is to allow the loss to be passed to the bank that
took the check from the payee for checks drawn on deposit accounts with
notations such as "authorized by drawer," when the check was not in fact
so authorized. 85 The Regulation CC commentary states that this definition
does not apply to checks where the drawer's signature is forged.86 This
Regulation CC warranty is also subject to defeat if the drawee bank has
failed to assert the bank statement rule preclusions against the purported
drawer. 87 Only banks make the new Regulation CC warranty. Thus, if the
presenting bank or other transferor bank has breached this warranty, the
bank-customer agreement between the payee and its bank (which will ei-
ther be a presenting bank or a transferor bank) will be the mechanism to
pass the loss to the payee based upon the unauthorized drawer's signature
on the remotely created check.88
The drawee bank may also try to pass the loss to the presenting bank
or the payee if the drawee bank can demonstrate that the purpose of pre-
senting or transferring the item was part of a scheme to defraud the drawee
bank.89 That, too, is often an unfruitful avenue of recovery in the run-of-
the-mill unauthorized drawer's signature case, because the payee and the
payee's bank may have no way of knowing that the drawer's signature was
in fact not authorized. 90
84. 12 C.F.R. § 229.2(fft) (2007).
85. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229, app. E, § II(FFF).
86. id.
87. 12 C.F.R. § 229.34(d)(2). This preclusion is broader than the preclusion stated in U.C.C.
section 4-406(f) or section 4-208(c). See supra note 82.
88. 12 C.F.R. pt. 229, app. E, § XX(D)(l).
89. See U.C.C. § 4-302(b) (2005). This "scheme to defraud" exception to the loss resting on the
drawee bank is keyed to drawee bank accountability stated in U.C.C. section 4-302(a). As stated in the
official comments, drawee bank accountability under U.C.C. section 4-302(a) occurs only if the drawee
bank has not made final payment. Id. § 3-502 cmt. 4. Final payment is made if the drawee bank pre-
serves its right to return the check and if it fails to return the check by its midnight deadline. Id. § 4-
215(a)(3). A drawee bank preserves its right to return the check by giving a provisional settlement to
the presenting bank by midnight of the banking day of receipt. Id. § 4-301(a). Accountability, as op-
posed to final payment, occurs when the payor bank fails to make a provisional settlement and thus fails
to preserve its right to return the item. See id. § 3-502 cmt. 4. But because the "scheme to defraud" rule
is stated as an exception to the "accountability" rule of U.C.C. section 4-302(a), it is not at all clear that
the "scheme to defraud" exception applies if the drawee bank has made final payment instead of be-
coming "accountable" for the check.
90. See. e.g., Bank of Am. NT & SA v. David W. Hubert, P.C., 101 P.3d 409 (Wash. 2004).
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c. Recovery Against the Wrongdoer
The last avenue of recovery for the drawee bank is to attempt to re-
cover from the wrongdoer (the unauthorized signor). The drawee bank has
the ability to subrogate to the rights of the payee or other holder (including
a holder in due course) on the check as against the drawer.91 As discussed
above, that gives the drawee bank rights as against the unauthorized signor,
not the purported drawer whose signature was forged.
92
5. Exceptions to the Allocation of Loss to the Payee of the Unauthorized
Drawer's Signature if the Check Is Dishonored
If the check is dishonored (generally when timely returned by the
drawee bank),93 the loss based upon an unauthorized drawer's signature
will fall on either the payee's bank or the payee. The returned check will
eventually be returned to the payee's bank and the payee's bank will charge
back the amount of the check against the payee's deposit account. 94 Thus in
Example 2, if First Bank dishonored the check, the check will be returned
to National Bank and National Bank will charge back the amount of the
check against Phil's account.
Phil will then seek to recover from Davis (the purported drawer) based
upon the forged drawer's signature on the instrument.95 Davis will place
the unauthorized signature in issue, and then Phil will have to prove that
the signature was in fact authorized or that Davis is precluded from assert-
ing the signature was unauthorized. 96 Even if Phil has the rights of a holder
in due course on the check, Davis can still assert the defense of an unau-
thorized signature against Phil. That is because Davis is not liable for the
contract obligation on the check unless he signed the check or is precluded
from asserting that his signature was not authorized.
97
The two prime avenues of precluding the purported drawer have al-
ready been discussed. Phil could attempt to show that Davis's negligence
substantially contributed to the making of the forgery of his signature. If
Davis was negligent, Phil was also negligent in taking the check from the
91. U.C.C. § 4-407.
92. Id. § 3-403; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
93. U.C.C. § 3-502(b).
94. Id. § 4-214. The payee's bank will suffer the loss in the event that bank is unable to recover
from the payee, such as when the payee has insufficient value in its account.
95. Id. § 3-414.
96. Id. § 3-308.
97. Id. §§ 3-401, 3-414. Proof of the signature is part of the prima facie case of the person seeking
to enforce contract liability on the instrument and thus forgery of the drawer's signature is failure of an
essential element of that prima facie case.
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wrongdoer, and that negligence substantially contributed to the loss, then
comparative loss principles will be used to allocate the loss between Davis
and Phil. 9 8 Phil could also attempt to demonstrate that Davis ratified the
wrongdoer's signature. 99 If able to demonstrate that fact, then Phil could
recover from Davis on the check. These two avenues of reallocating the
loss to Davis (the purported drawer) may not be successful when Phil seeks
to recover from the purported drawer on contract liability on the check
given the unique factual circumstances that must exist in each situation.100
Of course Phil could recover from Francis, the unauthorized signor, as
long as Phil took the check in good faith and for value.101 The unauthorized
signature of the drawer operates as the wrongdoer's signature on the check.
Thus the wrongdoer, Francis, is the drawer, no matter what name is signed
on the drawer's line on the check.10 2
6. Summary of Usual Rules of Loss Allocation Due to an Unauthorized
Drawer's Signature
As apparent after this long explanation, the bottom line is that if a
check is issued with an unauthorized drawer's signature and the check is
paid by the drawee bank, most often, but not always, the drawee bank will
be stuck with the loss unless it can recover from the unauthorized signor. If
that check is not paid by the drawee bank, most often, but not always, the
payee will be stuck with the loss unless it can recover from the unauthor-
ized signor. One of the problems of this scheme is that the above complex
set of rules allows for just enough avenues to change that rather simple
bottom line based upon peculiar facts and circumstances in any case. This
ability to readjust the bottom line risk allocation may encourage a higher
cost of allocating this risk than if there were not so many possible permuta-
tions for the possible risk allocation.
7. Loss Allocation if Check Truncation
Does this risk-allocation scheme for unauthorized drawers' signatures
stay in place if the check collection process is truncated by converting the
information from the check to electronic form? Consider the following
possible methods for truncation of the check collection process.
98. Id. § 3-406(b); see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
99. U.C.C. § 3-403; see supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
100. See 6 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 78, §§ 3-403:2 [Rev], 3-406:11-:14 [Rev].
101. U.C.C. § 3-403.
102. See 6 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 78, § 3-403:4 [Rev].
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One possibility is that the merchant takes the check from the purported
drawer, scans the electronic information from the check, inputs the amount,
and returns the check to that person. The merchant forwards the electronic
information through the banking system to the drawee bank. 103 Assume
rather than the merchant scanning the check for the electronic information,
the merchant deposits the paper check to its account at its depositary bank.
The depositary bank then scans the electronic information from the check,
keys in the amount, and transfers the electronic information through the
banking. system to the drawee bank. 10 4
In order for the risk-allocation rules of Articles 3 and 4 to apply, the
check must be a "writing" (Article 3)105 and an "item" (Article 4).106 Both
of these words have been interpreted to mean a paper format. 107 If the pa-
per format disappears at some point in the process, do Articles 3 and 4
continue to apply? Article 4 allows a small window of opportunity for elec-
tronic processing of checks by allowing for banks to make agreements for
electronic presentment of items.10 8 In essence, the drawee bank would
agree to accept presentment of the electronic information from the check
instead of insisting on the paper check. Article 4 would continue to apply
even though the "item" being presented was now in electronic form. This
type of agreement may arise between two or more banks or could take
103. See Heller, supra note 15, at 518 (describing using a check as a source document to create an
electronic funds transfer in the ACH network as a debit transaction, but noting that the transaction may
result in the information from the check being used to collect through the check network instead of the
ACH network).
104. See id., at 518-19, 527-29 (describing the method of either initiating an electronic funds
transfer or creating an image to be used in electronic presentment of checks).
105. U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(8) (definition of order), 1-201(b)(43) (definition of writing).
106. Id. § 4-104(a)(9) (definition of item, referring to an "order"), (c) (incorporating Article 3
definition of"order").
107. See Heller, supra note 15, at 514-15.
108. U.C.C. § 4-110. Article 4's allowance of electronic presentment does not necessarily mean
that the rules from Article 3 that relate to negotiable instruments (which must be in writing) will be
applicable to the electronic "item." Some of the rules from Article 3 that have been discussed include
the negligence rule in U.C.C. section 3-406, the liability of the drawer under U.C.C. section 3-414, and
ratification under U.C.C. section 3-403.
However, if the information from the check is converted to electronic form and then a substi-
tute check is created and presented as authorized under the Check Clearing for the 21 st Century Act of
2003 (Check 21 Act), Pub. L. No. 108-100, 117 Stat. 1177 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5018 (Supp.
IV 2004)), arguably Article 4 does not apply at all. There is no provision in Article 4 that allows for
truncation to electronics followed by a paper presentment. One of the purported benefits of the Check
21 Act was to speed up the collection process for checks. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE CHECK CLEARING FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
ACT OF 2003, at 4-6 (2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/RptCongress/
check21/check21 .pdf.
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place through clearing-house agreements 109 or by the Federal Reserve
Board operating circulars. 110
In each of the truncation scenarios outlined above, the question is
whether the Article 3 and 4 rules govern the allocation of risk from an un-
authorized drawer's signature or whether some other set of rules govern
that risk allocation once the information is converted from paper form to
electronic form. To consider that question fully, the rules regarding funds
transfers initiated through non-check mechanisms must first be explored.
B. Credit (Push) Payment Mechanisms: Article 4A
A check is a written order to a bank to transfer value from the payor
bank to the payee, regardless of whether the payee is a bank or has an ac-
count at another bank. The payee presents that instruction, and so a check
payment mechanism is generally considered to be a debit transfer.I' Now
consider a system whereby the payor instructs its bank to transfer value
from its account to the account of another person (either at the same bank
or a different bank). This is a type of transaction that does not depend upon
a written instruction and that requires the payee of the value to have an
account at a bank. In fact, the payor's instruction to its bank to transfer
funds to the payee's bank account can be given in any manner, including
orally or electronically."l 2 It is this type of payment mechanism that is cov-
ered by U.C.C. Article 4A. For purposes of discussion of Article 4A, as-
sume that no part of the payment transaction is covered by the EFTA and
Regulation E. 113 After discussion of Article 4A principles, this section will
discuss the application of the EFTA and Regulation E to this type of trans-
action.
Article 4A applies to credit (push) funds transfers. 114 Article 4A does
not cover debit (pull) funds transfers. 115 Funds transfers are defined as a
109. See U.C.C. § 4-110 cmt. 2. For example, a major clearing house offers electronic check pre-
sentment services and conducts that business pursuant to agreement among the participating banks. See
Press Release, The Clearing House Payments Co., SVPCO Image Payments Network Sets New Record
(Mar. 8, 2007), available at http://www.theclearinghouse.org/press-releases/svpco_2007/002 861 .php.
110. See U.C.C. § 4-110 cmt. 2; Fed. Reserve Bank, Operating Circular No. 3: Collection of Cash
Items and Returned Checks, app. E (July 2006), available at http://www.frbservices.org/Operating
Circulars/pdf/Oc3.pdf.
Ill. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
112. U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1).
113. Id. § 4A-108. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
114. U.C.C. §§ 4A-102, 4A-104, 4A-104 cmt. 4.
115. Id. §4A-lO4cmt. 4.
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series of payment orders 1 6 starting with the payor's instructions to its bank
to transfer value from its account at the payor bank to the payee by credit-
ing the payee's bank account. 117 The payor who starts the funds transfer is
called the originator and the payee is called the beneficiary.1 8 The payor
bank is called the originator's bank and the beneficiary's depositary institu-
tion is called the beneficiary's bank.1 9 Sometimes a funds transfer will be
simple and involve only the originator's bank and the beneficiary's bank.
Often, however, in order to effectuate the transfer of value from the origi-
nator to the beneficiary, the originator's bank will issue its own payment
order to an intermediary bank and the intermediary bank will issue its own
payment order to the beneficiary bank.120 An originator incurs liability to
the originator's bank by issuing a payment order that is accepted by the
originator's bank. 121 The originator's bank accepts the originator's pay-
ment order when it executes that order by issuing its own conforming pay-
ment order either to the beneficiary's bank or an intermediary bank.122
Similarly, the intermediary bank accepts the payment order of the origina-
tor's bank when it executes that order by issuing its own payment order to
either another intermediary bank or the beneficiary bank. 123 The benefici-
ary bank does not issue a payment order, but rather accepts the payment
order it receives, generally, by crediting the account of the beneficiary with
the amount of the payment order. 124 Upon the beneficiary bank's accep-
tance of the payment order it received, the originator's obligation to the
beneficiary is satisfied to the extent of the amount of the payment order. 125
Each payment order creates an independent liability of its sender to
the bank that accepted the payment order. 126 The beneficiary bank's accep-
tance of the payment order it received creates an independent obligation to
the beneficiary. 127 These obligations created by issued and accepted pay-
116. A payment order is an instruction to a bank to transfer value from that bank to another bank so
as to cause value to be credited to the beneficiary's account at the beneficiary bank. Id. § 4A-103(a)(1).
117. Id. §4A-104(a).
118. Id. §§ 4A-103(a)(2) (definition of beneficiary), 4A-104(c) (definition of originator).
119. Id. §§ 4A-103(a)(3) (definition of beneficiary's bank), 4A-104(d) (definition of originator's
bank).
120. See U.C.C. 4A prefatory note, § 4A-104(a) (definition of funds transfer), (b) (definition of
intermediary bank).
121. Id. § 4A-402(c) (the sender of the payment order obliged to pay when receiving bank accepts
payment order).
122. Id. §§ 4A-209(a) (acceptance of payment order), 4A-301(a) (execution of payment order).
123. Id. § § 4A-209(a) (acceptance of payment order), 4A-301(a) (execution of payment order).
124. Id. §§ 4A-209(b), 4A-404, 4A-405.
125. Id. § 4A-406(a).
126. U.C.C. 4A prefatory note, § 4A-402 cmt. 3.
127. See id. §4A-404.
[Vol 83:2
REIMAGINING PA YMENT SYSTEMS
ment orders are generally satisfied by a series of debits and credits in bank
accounts. 128 For example, the originator's bank generally debits the ac-
count of the originator when it accepts the originator's payment order. As-
sume the originator's bank has an account at the beneficiary bank and the
originator's bank sends its payment order (issued to execute the origina-
tor's payment order) to the beneficiary bank. When the beneficiary bank
accepts the payment order from the originator's bank, the beneficiary bank
debits the originator's bank account held by the beneficiary bank and cred-
its the beneficiary's account with the beneficiary bank.129
An originator's bank is taking a risk that the originator's payment or-
der is not authorized when it decides to accept the originator's payment
order by issuing its own conforming payment order to either the intermedi-
ary bank or the beneficiary bank. The general rule is that if the purported
originator's payment order was not authorized by the originator pursuant to
principles of agency law, the originator is not obligated to pay the amount
of that payment order. 130 If the originator's bank then issues its own pay-
ment order in execution of the unauthorized payment order, the originator's
bank may have to pay its own payment order if the funds transfer is com-
pleted by the beneficiary bank accepting the payment order it receives. 131
Because the purported originator, who did not authorize the payment order
to the originator's bank, is not liable for the amount of the unauthorized
payment order, the originator's bank may not charge the originator's ac-
count. 132 In essence, the originator's bank has the liability for having exe-
cuted a payment order in acceptance of an unauthorized payment order.
The originator's bank may shift the risk of that unauthorized payment
order to the purported originator if the originator and the originator's bank
have entered into an agreement that the authenticity of payment orders will
be tested with a commercially reasonable security procedure and the bank
proves that it accepted the payment order in good faith and in compliance
with the security procedure. 133 This rule regarding use of the security pro-
cedure is subject to an exception if the originator can prove that the unau-
thorized payment order was caused by someone who did not obtain access
to the information to use the security procedure from the originator or a
128. Id. §§ 4A-403, 4A-405.
129. See MILLER & HARRELL, supra note 1, 10.07.
130. U.C.C. § 4A-202.
131. Id. § 4A-402.
132. Id. § 4A-202.
133. Id. If the customer of the receiving bank has refused a commercially reasonable security
procedure and agreed in writing to liability for payment orders sent pursuant to a security procedure the
customer designated, that designated security procedure is deemed commercially reasonable. Id.
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source controlled by the originator. 134 This exception is not dependent on
how the access information was obtained or the originator's failure to exer-
cise any degree of care. 135 If the exception applies, the originator is not
liable for the amount of the unauthorized payment order even if the com-
mercially reasonable security procedure was in effect and used by the
originator's bank.136 This set of rules is designed to create incentives for
the originator's bank to offer commercially reasonable security procedures
and for both the originator and the originator's bank to safeguard informa-
tion regarding use of the security procedures. 137
C. Credit or Debit Transfers Involving a Consumer Bank Account: EFTA
and Regulation E
Article 4A will not apply to any part of a credit transfer in which a
consumer's bank account is debited for a funds transfer which is initiated
through an electronic means. 138 Rather, the transaction will be governed by
the EFTA and Regulation E. 139 Unlike Article 4A, the EFTA and Regula-
tion E do not address all aspects of the funds transfer. Rather, the focus of
the EFTA and Regulation E is on regulation of the relationship between the
consumer and the bank holding the consumer's bank account. 140 The EFTA
and Regulation E apply to both credit and debit transactions involving a
consumer's bank account as long as the instruction is initiated through
electronic means. 14
1
One of the primary regulations of this relationship is the protection of
the consumer from liability for unauthorized debits to his or her account.
An unauthorized funds transfer is defined as a funds transfer "from a con-
sumer's account initiated by a person other than the consumer without ac-
tual authority to initiate such transfer and from which the consumer
receives no benefit." 142 A funds transfer is not unauthorized if the con-
134. Id. § 4A-203.
135. Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 5.
136. Id.
137. 6 HAWKLAND & LAWRENCE, supra note 78, § 4A-203:3. The extent to which this risk-
allocation scheme can be altered by contract is a matter of some debate. See Paul S. Turner, The UCC
Drafting Process and Six Questions About Article 4A: Is There a Need for Revisions to the Uniform
Funds Transfers Law?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 351 (1994).
138. U.C.C. § 4A-108.
139. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Citations to the EFTA will be to the sections as
codified in the United States Code. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (2000) (definition of "electronic fund trans-
fer"); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2007).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1693(b); 12 C.F.R. § 205.1(b).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (definition of "electronic fund transfer"); 12 C.F.R. § 205.3.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(l 1); see 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m).
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sumer furnishes a device used to access the account to the wrongdoer or the
consumer is a participant in the wrongdoing.143
A consumer will be liable for an unauthorized electronic funds trans-
fer from the consumer's bank account only if the consumer's bank has
provided the disclosures required by Regulation E. 144 In addition, if the
manner of accessing the consumer's account was an access device, 145 the
access device must have been an accepted access device 46 and the bank
must have provided a means to identify the consumer to whom it was is-
sued. 147 The paradigm example of an access device is a debit card. 148 An
access device may also be a password or code used to access the con-
sumer's bank account information in a web-based format. 149 If those condi-
tions are not met, then the consumer will have no liability at all for the
unauthorized electronic funds transfer. 150 Rather, the consumer's deposi-
tary bank will bear that risk. This allocation of risk gives the consumer's
bank an incentive to provide the disclosures and to provide a means for
identifying the consumer authorized to use the access device.
If those conditions are met, then the consumer will be liable for an un-
authorized debit to its account in fairly limited circumstances. First, if the
access device has been lost or stolen, and the consumer notifies the con-
sumer's bank within two business days after learning of the loss or theft,
the consumer's liability is limited to a maximum of $50. The consumer
may not be liable even for that amount if the amount of unauthorized trans-
fers that took place before the consumer gave notice to the bank was less
than $50.151
Second, if the access device is lost or stolen and the consumer does
not give notice to the bank within two business days after learning of the
loss or theft, the consumer's liability is limited to $500. The consumer's
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(1 1); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m). The regulation provides that a funds transfer is
also not unauthorized if the bank holding the account or its employee initiates the debit. 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.2(m)(3). The official staff commentary to the regulation states, however, "A consumer has no
liability for erroneous or fraudulent transfers initiated by an employee of a financial institution." 12
C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. I, § 205.2, cmt. 2(m), note 1.
144. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
145. An access device is a "card, code, or other means of access to a consumer's account, or any
combination thereof, that may be used by the consumer to initiate electronic funds transfers." 12 C.F.R.
§ 205.2(a)(1).
146. An access device is "accepted" when the consumer requests, receives, signs, or uses an access
device, requests validation of an unsolicited access device, or receives a renewal or substitute access
device to replace a previously accepted access device from the same bank. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(2).
147. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
148. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. I, § 205.2, cmt. 2(a), note 1.
149. Id.
150. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(a).
151. Id. § 205.6(b)(1).
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liability could be less than $500 if the amounts of the unauthorized trans-
fers that took place before notice to the bank were less than the $500
maximum and the bank proves that the unauthorized transfers would not
have taken place if the consumer had notified the bank within the two busi-
ness day time period.
152
Third, if the bank transmits a periodic statement to the consumer, the
consumer does not report unauthorized transfers that are on that statement
within sixty days of its transmittal to the consumer, and the bank proves
that subsequent unauthorized transfers could have been prevented if the
consumer had made the report within the sixty days, the consumer will be
liable for unauthorized transfers that take place after that sixty day time
period. 153 This rule applies regardless of whether there is loss or theft of an
access device. 15
4
The official staff commentary to Regulation E notes that these risk-
allocation rules apply regardless of whether the consumer has been negli-
gent in safeguarding the access device or account information. 155 The bank
cannot impose greater liability on the consumer by agreement with the
consumer. 156 The time periods noted above can be extended if there are
extenuating circumstances, such as the consumer's hospitalization or ex-
tended travel away from home. 157
As briefly noted above, a check may be used to initiate a funds trans-
fer from an account. 158 Recent amendments to Regulation E and its com-
mentary provide that if a check is used as a source document for the
information necessary to initiate a funds transfer from the consumer's bank
account (generally the routing number and the account number from the
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition line, or "MICR line," on the check),
Regulation E will cover that transaction. 159 The check is not an "access
device," however, so the consumer's liability for unauthorized transfers is
limited to the third rule (periodic statement rule) stated above. 160 Regula-
tion E requires that the consumer be given notice that the transaction initi-
ated by check will be processed as a funds transfer instead of through the
check collection channel. 16t In some circumstances it may be unclear
152. Id. § 205.6(b)(2).
153. Id. § 205.6(b)(3).
154. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp, 1, § 205.6, cmt. 6(b), para. (6)(b)(3), note 2.
155. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. I, § 205.6, cmt. 6(b), note 2.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 16931(2000).
157. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(4).
158. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
159. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2).
160. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. 1, § 205.2, cmt. 2(a), note 2.
161. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2).
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whether the check is being processed as a funds transfer, covered by Regu-
lation E, as opposed to taking advantage of an electronic presentment
agreement with the drawee bank, as allowed by Article 4.162
D. Debit or Credit Transfers Governed by System Rules
Funds transfers may be processed through funds-transfer systems as
opposed to solely through banks or similar financial institutions. Article 4A
defers in some instances to funds-transfer system rules. 163 Article 4A also
defers to Federal Reserve System regulations and operating circulars that
govern Fedwire, the funds-transfer network run by the Federal Reserve
Banks. 164
One of the most widely used systems for funds transfers is the private
network for processing Automated Clearing House (ACH) transactions.165
Entities that use the system agree to a set of operating rules and guidelines
to govern funds-transfer transactions between the entities that are part of
the network. 166 Both credit and debit payments are processed through the
ACH network. 167 Each transaction starts with an originating depositary
financial institution (ODFI) which gives an instruction to either credit or
debit an account at the receiving depositary financial institution (RDFI). 168
The ODFI makes warranties for any origination of either a credit or a debit
ACH transaction. One of these warranties is that the credit to the receiver's
account or debit from the receiver's account is authorized. 169 The ODFI's
loss from an unauthorized origination is then allocated to the person that
originated the transaction with the ODFI. 170 The ODFI does so through
agreement with the originator prior to processing any transactions with the
originator. 171 If the transaction is governed by Article 4A (a credit transac-
tion), or by Regulation E, the rules discussed above regarding liability for
unauthorized funds transfers cannot be varied by agreement or the funds-
transfer system rules. 172
162. Heller, supra note 15, at 525-29; see supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
163. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b) (2005). The liability rules for unauthorized transfers as against an entity
that is not a bank may not be changed by a system rule. Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 7.
164. Id. § 4A- 107. In Regulation J, the Federal Reserve Board has adopted many of the provisions
of Article 4A to govern Fedwire transfers. 12 C.F.R. § 210.25.
165. See Heller, supra note 15, at 517 n.20.
166. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 16, at ACH Primer 13.
167. Id. at ACH Primer 3-4.
168. Id.
169. Id. §§ 2.2.1.1, 2.2.3, at OR 5-6.
170. Id. § 2.1.l,atOR2;id. § 5.3, atOR23.
171. See id. § II, ch. 1, at OG 17 ("Compliance With Security Procedures").
172. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt. 7 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 16931 (2000).
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When a check is truncated during the collection process, the truncation
may take place either because it becomes an ACH transaction or because
the check is being collected through systems that allow for electronic pre-
sentment of items. Recall the discussion of a merchant using the check as a
source document, that is, using the MICR line information, keying in the
amount, and sending the information to the drawer's bank to debit the
drawer's account. 173 Typically, that is a scenario in which the information
is being used to initiate an ACH debit transaction from the drawer's bank
account. Both Regulation E and ACH rules would generally apply if the
debit was from a consumer's deposit account. 174 ACH rules, but not Regu-
lation E, would apply if the debit was from a non-consumer's deposit ac-
count. 175 Article 4A would not apply, regardless of the status of the payor,
as the transfer is a debit transfer, not a credit transfer. 176 Presumably, the
use of the check as a source document is done with notice to the drawer (in
ACH terms, the receiver) and at least the implied authorization of the
drawer. In a face-to-face transaction, the originator (the merchant) is sup-
posed to have posted notice that the transaction will be processed as an
ACH transaction. 177 If the truncation of the check happens when the mer-
chant receives the check in the mail, the merchant should have given notice
at the time of billing the drawer for the product or services supplied or as
part of the agreement with the drawer (such as payment to credit card or
utility payees) that all checks would be truncated and turned into ACH
debit transactions.] 78
Presumably, in either of these scenarios, the loss allocation principles
will be governed by ACH rules and Regulation E, if applicable, and not by
the U.C.C. Article 3 and 4 principles discussed above, even though the
transaction was initiated using a check. The non-consumer drawer's rights
would initially be covered by the agreement it had with its bank (in ACH
terms, the RDFI). 179 Assuming the bank account agreement did not accord
absolute liability to the non-consumer drawer, the drawer would seek to
have the account recredited and the RDFI would recover on the ACH war-
173. Supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. Interestingly, if the ACH payment is trans-
mitted over Fedwire, there is a strong argument that the Regulation E protections for a consumer do not
apply. 12 C.F.R. § 205.3(c)(3) (2007).
175. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 161 and accompanying text; 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 16, § 11, ch. 1, at
OG 38.
178. 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 16, § Ii, ch. 1, at OG at 38-39.
179. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text; 2007 ACH RULES, supra note 16, § 11, ch. 4,
at OG 76-77.
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ranties from the ODFI. The ODFI would pass the loss to the merchant initi-
ating the transaction using the check.1 80
In contrast, if the check rules applied, the loss would rest on the RDFI
as the check with the unauthorized drawer's signature would not be prop-
erly payable from the drawer's account and the RDFI (the drawee) would
not be able to recover in most circumstances from the presenting bank (the
ODFI, in ACH terms). 181 The check rules would apply if the originally
issued check was truncated using agreements for electronic check present-
ment instead of being converted to an ACH transaction. 182
E. Debit Transfers Not Governed by EFTA, Regulation E,
or System Rules
Assume that a person initiates a pull transaction from a non-consumer
account that is not processed through a funds-transfer system (or through
Fedwire), so that Article 4A, the EFTA, and system rules do not apply. In
this transaction, allocation of the risk of an unauthorized debit to the bank
account would be a matter of private agreement between the participants in
the system. An example of this situation would be where Person A, a non-
consumer account holder at Bank A, has Bank A issue an instruction to
Bank B to debit the account of non-consumer account holder, Person B,
and credit the account of Person A at Bank A. Assuming Person A is acting
without the actual authorization of Person B, Person A is likely to have
some sort of forged authorization that would purportedly demonstrate to
both Bank A and Bank B that Person A was authorized to pull the funds
from Person B's account. If Bank A and Bank B executed those instruc-
tions without using any funds-transfer system, such as ACH, the allocation
of the risk of Person A not being authorized would likely be determined by
the bank-customer agreement between Person B and Bank B and indemnity
arrangements between Bank A and Bank B.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR RISK ALLOCATION OF UNAUTHORIZED
PAYMENT INCEPTION
Does it have to be so complicated? Are the rules used to allocate the
risk of this type of fraud sensible in terms of the policies that should be
advanced? One of the benefits of an exercise of imagination is the ability to
look beyond the status quo and ask this question: if we could design a sys-
180. Seesupra notes 169-71.
181. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text; Heller, supra note 15, at 524 n.57.
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tern of legal rules today that would allocate the risk of unauthorized debits
to a deposit account, what considerations and principles should we take
into account in designing those rules? 183 This exercise in imagination
should not be tethered to how it has always been done, but rather should be
a free-ranging inquiry as to whether there is a better way to allocate the risk
than under current law.' 84 When judging whether there is a "better" way, it
is essential to ask what objectives should guide the conclusion that a new
way is "better" than the current methods. 1
85
183. The New Payments Code project of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute was an example of one attempt to engage in this more
unified process. That project failed in part in the early 1980s, but out of that process U.C.C. Article 4A
was developed, and a much smaller revision project of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 was undertaken. See
generally Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles of Payment Law, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 753, 773-75 (1997); Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39
Bus. LAW. 1215 (1984); Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42
ALA. L. REV. 405 (1991); Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., The UCC Process-Consensus and Balance, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 287 (1994); Hal S. Scott, Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664 (1983); James V. Vergari, A Critical Look at the New Uniform Payments
Code, 9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 317 (1983); Note, Consumer Protection and Payment
Systems: Regulatory Policy for the Technological Era, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1870 (1985); Note, Overcom-
ing the Obstacles to Implementation of Point-of-Sale Electronic Fund Transfer Systems: EFTA and the
New Uniform Payments Code, 69 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1983).
184. Payments law has been the subject of recent commentary regarding whether the risk-allocation
rules make sense in the modem environment with the proliferation of payment mechanisms. See, e.g.,
Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products and Systems: The Need for Uniformity and the Risk of
Political Defeat, 24 ANN. REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 247 (2005) [hereinafter Budnitz, Consumer
Payment Products]; Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards and the Consumer: The Need for Regulation,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1997); Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information
Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633 (2005); Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit
Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951 (1997); James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instru-
ments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929 (1987); James
Steven Rogers, The Myth of Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REV. 265 (1990); James Steven Rogers, The New
Old Law of Electronic Money, 58 SMU L. REv. 1253 (2005).
This inquiry should also not ignore the international aspect of payments law. See generally
Carl Felsenfeld, The Compatibility of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers
with Article 4A of the UCC, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. (COLLOQUIUM) S53 (1992); Mark Sneddon, The
Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on the Law of International Credit Transfers, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
This article does not address issues concerning the enforcement of criminal laws, such as anti-
money laundering regulation. See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT
METHODS (2006), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/30/47/37627240.pdf.
185. For an argument that the funds-transfer system should serve the purpose of effective function-
ing of the financial markets, see Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. L.J.
347 (1993); Steven B. Dow & Nan S. Ellis, The Proposed Uniform New Payments Code: Allocation of
Losses Resulting from Forged Drawers' Signatures, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 399 (1985) (critiquing the
change in loss allocation for forged drawer's signature as proposed in the new payments code, arguing
that the payor bank will have no incentive to try and avoid the loss under the proposed rules).
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In evaluating any objectives that are considered for building186 a better
risk-allocation system, one of the guiding considerations has to be balanc-
ing the costs of operating the system as it is, including the cost of unauthor-
ized debit risk allocation, against the cost and feasibility of implementing
new legal rules that would change that risk allocation in order to create
incentives to reduce the amount of losses incurred. 187 If a new set of rules
would help prevent losses without significant increase in transaction costs,
the system as a whole could function more efficiently, thus better facilitat-
ing economic activity. 188
Another objective should be the clear allocation of risk in a transpar-
ent set of rules whereby the system participants know what risks they are
taking on in using the system. 189 The current diversity in risk-allocation
rules depending on the mechanism used, the method of processing, and the
186. Part of the challenge of building a better payment system is figuring out the appropriate
mechanism for drafting the risk-allocation rules. Just what process would be best to construct a more
functional set of risk-allocation rules is a matter of debate. When the New Payments Code failed and
the 1990 revisions of U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 were promulgated, there was widespread criticism and
defense of the uniform laws process concerning the degree to which the changes were perceived as
being too "industry friendly." See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Revision of U.C.C. Articles Three and
Four: A Process Which Excluded Consumer Protection Requires Federal Action, 43 MERCER L. REV.
827 (1992); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process:
Some Lessons From the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993); Donald J. Rapson,
Who is Looking Out for the Public Interest? Thoughts About the UCC Revision Process in the Light
(and Shadows) of Professor Rubin 's Observations, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249 (1994); Edward Rubin,
Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991); Edward
L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC
Articles 3 and 4, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 743 (1993).
When Congress enacted the Check 21 Act in 2003, see supra note 108, there was criticism of
that law from the perspective of the uncertainties it created for rights and liabilities concerning substi-
tute checks. See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld and Genci Bilali, The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act-A
Wrong Turn in the Road to Improvement of the U.S. Payments System, 85 NEB. L. REV. 52 (2006);
Mark Hargrave, Check 21: A Year in the Life, 38 UCC L.J. 233 (2006).
187. See BIS, supra note 3, § 3.3.1, at 6 ("A system's rules and procedures should therefore ensure
that all parties have both the incentives and the capabilities to manage and contain each of the risks they
bear and that limits are placed on the maximum level of credit exposure that can be produced by each
participant."); id. §§ 7.8.16-.19, at 47; Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Pay-
ment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 221 (1996). See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of
Wire Transfer Law and International Financial Market Interest Groups, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 667, 669-
70 (1994) (assessing risks based on economic principles and banking system concerns to determine
whether payment system rules strike the right balance).
188. See Bhala, supra note 185, at 377-78 (focusing on large dollar value funds transfers in sophis-
ticated financial markets). Whether the payment system should be structured to provide access for
persons of more limited means is an interesting policy issue. See Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21
YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004).
189. See FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ON PAYMENTS SYSTEM RISK, supra note 1, at 11; BIS, supra
note 3, § 3.2.1, at 6 ("Participants ... should understand clearly the financial risks in the system and
where they are borne."). But see Budnitz, Consumer Payment Products, supra note 184, at 278 (arguing
that consumers should have a uniform rule for all payment products but should not have more liability
than what they currently have for unauthorized payment inceptions).
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type of deposit account held, is anything but transparent and clear. That
lack of transparency imposes a cost on the system of transferring value.
A. Risk Spreading
Consider one possible objective for revision of the risk-allocation
rules of unauthorized debits to a deposit account: allocate the loss of unau-
thorized debits to the person in the best position to spread the loss among
all the players in the payment system. 190 If this objective was the primary
focus, the typical entities that could spread the loss among payment system
players would be the payor bank or the payee's bank.191 Either of those
entities could price their services based upon a certain predictable percent-
age of losses from unauthorized debits and, through pricing, spread those
losses.192 If risk spreading was the policy basis, the rule for risk allocation
for an unauthorized debit could be relatively simple. For example:
A financial institution may debit its customer's account only for amounts
authorized by its customer. A debit is authorized by the customer only if
the customer actually authorized the debit or is bound to the authoriza-
tion under principles of agency law. This rule may not be altered by
agreement between the customer and the financial institution.
This rule would allocate the risk of an unauthorized debit to the de-
positary institution holding the deposit account. The only factual dispute
would be "authorization."
The difficulty with this approach is that it does not take into account
whether there are any opportunities for loss prevention. While not all unau-
thorized debits can be prevented, the cost of unauthorized debits to the
payment system as a whole should not be underestimated. 193 A loss spread-
ing rationale would accept the level of unauthorized debits as a cost of
doing business and would not necessarily foster any incentives or realistic
opportunities to decrease the cost of operating the payment system as a
whole. Using the rule given above as an example, the customer would not
have any incentive to safeguard its account information or monitor its ac-
count transactions. The payor bank would take the risk for its customer's
behavior with very little ability to control that risk.
190. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments,
66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 71-72 (1987).
191. See id. at 72.
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., A SUMMARY OF THE




Structuring a rule that would make the payee's bank the risk spreader
is somewhat problematic. A possible rule is as follows:
A paying bank may recover from a payee bank if the payee bank ob-
tained credits from the paying bank based upon an unauthorized debit
from the account of a customer of the paying bank. A debit is authorized
by the customer of the paying bank only if the customer actually author-
ized the debit or is bound to the authorization under principles of agency
law. A payee bank that is obligated to the paying bank for the amount of
the credit may not deduct the recovered credit from its customer's ac-
count. This rule may not be altered by agreement.
Placing the loss on the payee's bank further divorces risk prevention
from risk bearing unless one presumes that the payee is the bad actor, and
the rule creates an incentive for the payee's bank to "know its customer."
Even having said that, placing the risk on the payee's bank to further loss-
spreading principles does not give the payee bank any mechanism for pro-
tecting against the loss without extensive screening and ongoing monitor-
ing of its customer's business practices. That monitoring also increases the
cost of this risk-allocation rule.
B. Certainty of Result of Risk Allocation and Finality of Payment
Another objective for allocating the risk of fraudulent payment incep-
tions could be creating certainty of result, that is, a clear rule that allocated
the risk to a player in the system so that player would know that if the risk
happened that person would bear the risk. This would ultimately encourage
the risk bearer to take what the risk bearer perceived as adequate precau-
tions to either prevent the risk from happening or to insure against the risk
if it happened in spite of precautions. If certainty of result was the only
objective, it would not matter who the player was that bore the risk (the
payor, the payor bank, the payee, the payee's bank, or an intermediary
bank), as long as the result was clear. 194 It would be that designated risk
taker's problem.
Another objective that could be pursued that is closely related to cer-
tainty of result is the protection of finality of payment. That is, if there is a
debit from the account, even if unauthorized, the finality of that payment
should be respected and the ability to reverse that transaction (and allocate
the loss to someone other than the payor or the payor bank) should not be
allowed. 195 Finality of payment allows for protection of payees and inter-
194. Cf Rogers, supra note 7, at 467 (arguing that "unpreventable" losses should be born by the
providers of the system (the banks) and not the users of the system).
195. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition Between
Established and Emerging Electronic Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 679 (1999)
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mediaries in the system that may not be able to determine that the pur-
ported payor's instruction to the payor bank was unauthorized. Finality of
payment principles encourages use of a payment system. 196 For instance,
currency transactions have a very strong finality principle. Other than the
ability to recover currency from the person who stole it from the currency
owner, transferees of currency for value and without notice that the cur-
rency is stolen are protected from the currency owner's claim that the cur-
rency should be returned to the owner.197 The finality of the transaction
between the innocent taker for value and the person it dealt with is more
important than the property-based claim of the rightful owner to the cur-
rency. This rule is often justified as essential to a monetary, as opposed to a
barter, payment system because it encourages acceptance of the monetary
token. 198
Certainty of result and finality of payment as objectives would cut
down the transaction costs of a risk-allocation system that placed the risk
on other parties in a manner that depended upon the facts and circum-
stances of an individual case. 199 This reduction of cost in operating the
payment system would be a significant benefit of a rule that placed the
liability on a designated risk taker in all circumstances in order to protect
the finality of a payment once made. The rule given above, which places
the loss on the payor's institution, creates a certain result and respects final-
ity of payment. The rule placing the risk on the payee bank, while creating
a certain result, does not respect finality of payment principles.
Certainty of result and finality of payment cannot be the only objec-
tives. For one thing, if the designated risk taker could not do anything to
prevent the risk, in essence the system would be treating the designated risk
taker as an insurer of the system. In order for the designated risk taker to be
agreeable to taking on that risk,200 the risk taker would need some form of
(finality is essential to a functioning payment system). There is an argument that finality of payment
should bow to the user's ability to stop payment so as to enable the user to exercise leverage in the
underlying transaction. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Payment Systems: Leverage
Effects Within an Electronic Funds Transfer System, 17 HOuS. L. REV. 487 (1980).
196. See Bhala, supra note 185, at 385-89. A closely related issue is the ability to control systemic
risk that may result to the payment system as a whole if payments are not cleared in a timely manner
and transactions could be unwound if a participant was unable to clear the payment. Id. at 390-93. See
generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS., FEDWIRE FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEM:
ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CORE PRINCIPLES FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT PAYMENT
SYSTEMS (rev. ed. 2006), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coreprinciples/
coreprinciples.pdf.
197. See City of Portland v. Berry, 739 P.2d 1041 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
198. Seeid. at 1044.
199. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 190, at 78.




compensation for that risk, just as an insurer is compensated through pre-
mium payments for taking on risks that it cannot prevent. This insurance-
orientated principle may create a separation between the entity that bears
the costs and the entity that may be able to prevent the costs. 201 That sepa-
ration is expensive for a payment system, as it may not lead to reduction in
this type of risk at all. Thus, if the payor bank must always take the loss,
the payor, or other parties in the system, may lose any realistic incentive to
try to prevent the loss. The payor bank may also implement loss-prevention
principles that would unduly burden the functioning of the system or price
its services at a cost that makes the payment system uneconomical for use,
in order to compensate itself for taking the risk of losses that another party
might have had the ability to prevent, to the detriment of the overall eco-
nomic system that payments supports.
C. Best Position to Prevent the Loss
Perhaps the objective of the risk-allocation rules for unauthorized deb-
its to a deposit account should not be randomly allocated to any player in
the system, but rather the risk should fall on the player in the best position
to protect against the unauthorized debit.202 Given the structure of deposit
accounts, the two most likely risk holders using this principle are the payor
and the payor bank. All of the other players in the system are not in a posi-
tion to evaluate the authenticity of instructions directed at a deposit ac-
count, that is, whether the payor really authorized the debit from the
account. A rule that allocates the risk of authenticity to the payor bank was
already given above. A rule that would allocate the risk of authenticity to
the payor could be as follows:
A financial institution may debit its customer's account for an authorized
or an unauthorized debit.
Are either the payor or the payor bank (or both) in a position to evalu-
ate the authenticity of the payor's instruction directly to the payor bank (a
credit transfer), or funneled through the payee (a debit transfer)? Is that a
viable premise as a matter of factual reality?
Consider the payor bank. A check is written purportedly signed by the
drawer. Under current banking standards and processing methods, it is not
feasible for someone at the payor bank to actually determine if the signa-
ture on the check is in fact that of the purported drawer. Even if it was cost
201. This is often referred to as a moral hazard that is often associated with policy analysis regard-
ing where the loss should be placed in discussions of tort law. See generally Tom Baker, On the Gene-
alogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237 (1996).
202. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 190, at 73-75.
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effective to have an actual person examine the signatures, the ability for
that person, even if qualified as a handwriting expert, to make sure that the
signature on the check matches the signature on the account's signature
card is purely fictional. Now consider a funds transfer from the payor's
account in which a plastic card is used at a point-of-sale terminal to initiate
the debit. Is it feasible for the payor bank to determine if the person actu-
ally using the card is in fact the payor or someone that the payor authorized
to use the card? Additional codes, such as a PIN, may be required, but that
is no guarantee that the payor authorized the usage. Biometrics such as
thumbprints, eye scans, or other biological indicators could be input and
sent along with the payment information.203 Current technology may not be
capable of handling that data either at the inception end or at the payor
bank's processing facilities. In addition, that sort of data collection may
raise privacy concerns. 204
Now consider whether the payor is in a position to evaluate the au-
thenticity of the instruction to debit the account. The payor does not have
ready access to the information that the payor bank receives when an in-
struction is given to that bank to debit the payor's account. Therefore, in
order for the payor to evaluate the instruction to debit the account, the
payor bank would have to contact the payor to determine whether the in-
struction was authentic. Should the system rule require that before any
debits are made, the payor is contacted for specific authorization? While
this would probably cut down on the number of unauthorized debits, the
cost of this approach would be significant and the speed of payment clear-
ance would be seriously undermined.
Should the system rules instead require the payor to notify the payor
bank anytime a payment has been authorized, so the bank would know that
when the payment came into the bank's system the instruction to debit the
account should be followed? While that system is likely to be less expen-
sive than an individualized contact with each payor as instructions are re-
ceived by the bank, it also is not a fail-safe system. How would the payor
bank know that the purported payor giving the advance approval is in fact
the authorized payor? Some sort of authentication procedure would have to
be in place. How would this type of system deal with transactions that are
not planned in advance, such as the Sunday shopping expedition where the
purported payor is making purchases and payment instructions are trans-
mitted from the point of sale? Should the payor have to present himself or
203. See id. at 76-77 (noting that technology might be able to reduce losses).
204. See generally Shane L. Smith, Gone in a Blink: The Overlooked Privacy Problems Caused by
Contactless Payment Systems, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 213 (2007).
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herself physically at the payor bank to withdraw credits from the deposit
account?
If the payor is expected to evaluate the authenticity of instruction to
debit the account, should the relative sophistication of the payor be taken
into account? Should the payor who is an individual consumer be held to a
different standard for verifying authenticity than a multi-national, billion-
dollar corporation?
Instead of thinking that the loss has to be either totally on the payor
bank or on the payor, consider whether the system rules should encourage
the payor to safeguard its information concerning instructions to the payor
bank and the payor bank to provide mechanisms to assist the payor in that
regard. Of course, to the extent that the rules rely on too many factual de-
terminations in a specific case, that will increase the transaction costs re-
lated to allocation of the loss. 205
In considering rules that would focus on the payor's efforts to safe-
guard the information for giving the instruction, several different options
are possible. One option could be an "ordinary care" rule, that is, the payor
has the obligation to use ordinary care in safeguarding the information used
to instruct the payor bank to debit the payor's account. The payor would be
liable for any unauthorized debit in which it was demonstrated the payor
failed to use ordinary care. An example of such a rule is as follows:
(1) A financial institution may debit a customer's account only if:
(a) The debit is authorized by the customer; or
(b) The debit is unauthorized and the customer's failure to use ordi-
nary care resulted in the unauthorized debit.
(2) A debit is authorized by the customer only if the customer actually
authorized the debit or is bound to the authorization under principles
of agency law.
This option does not offer any incentive for the payor bank to offer
mechanisms to assist the payor in safeguarding access to the account, nor
does it take into account any steps that the payor bank should take on its
own to be sure it is acting on authorized instructions. To take into account
the payor bank's actions, one could use a comparative or contributory neg-
ligence analysis to determine who is more "at fault" in allowing the unau-
thorized payment. Inquiry into either the payor's or the payor bank's failure
to act with ordinary care is a factually uncertain and potentially expensive
inquiry.206 Is the expense and uncertainty worth the effect it may have on
encouraging incentives to prevent loss due to an unauthorized debit? Can




advice be given with a relative level of confidence that if these precautions
are taken, the relevant actor has acted with ordinary care? In addition, does
the "ordinary care" standard set the right standard of behavior? Perhaps
merely being not negligent is not a sufficient level of incentive to take care
given the structure of modem banking and the electronic communication
environment.
Allocation of the risk of unauthorized payments between the payor
and the payor bank could be made more certain, that is, not dependant upon
a standard such as the lack of ordinary care. One way to split the risk, but
not hinge it to a factual inquiry, is to limit the ability to debit the payor's
account based upon some percentage of the amount of the unauthorized
instruction. The percentage could be mandated at a fixed point or it could
float based upon some external scale, such as the value of all amounts on
deposit with that institution, the average value of a transaction, or the aver-
age volume of transactions. The key to fixing the percentage would be to
attempt to predict what level of risk sharing would lead to the optimal level
of precautions against the unauthorized debit. 207 A possible articulation of
this type of rule could be:
A financial institution may debit its customer's account for XXXX% of
the amount of an unauthorized debit. A debit is unauthorized if the cus-
tomer did not actually authorize the debit or is not bound to the authori-
zation under principles of agency law. This rule may not be altered by
agreement.
This percentage could be very difficult to fix at the optimal level and
there is no empirical data that would be very helpful in picking what the
right level of risk sharing is. Any percentage would thus be somewhat arbi-
trary. Arbitrariness, however, is cheaper than factual inquiry regarding
ordinary care.
Another approach is to encourage the payor and the payor bank to put
into place security procedures by which authenticity could be verified at the
time the payor bank received the instruction to debit the account. A possi-
ble rule using this approach is as follows:
A financial institution may debit a customer's account only if:
(a) the customer actually authorized the debit or is bound by the authori-
zation under the law of agency; or
(b) the customer and the financial institution have agreed to use a com-
mercially reasonable security procedure to verify the authenticity of
207. Alternatively, the payor's liability could be fixed at a capped amount, as in the credit card
rules. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b) (2007). Setting the optimal level of the cap could be as difficult as
setting the optimal percentage, as stated in the text. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 190, at 97.
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the debit and the financial institution complied with the procedure to
authenticate the debit instruction.
Similar to the rule in Article 4A,208 this rule places an incentive on the
financial institution to offer commercially reasonable security procedures.
As noted in the comment to Article 4A:
In a very large percentage of cases covered by Article 4A, transmission
of the payment order is made electronically. The receiving bank may be
required to act on the basis of a message that appears on a computer
screen. Common law concepts of authority of agent to bind principal are
not helpful. There is no way of determining the identity or the authority
of the person who caused the message to be sent. The receiving bank is
not relying on the authority of any particular person to act for the pur-
ported sender .... Rather, the receiving bank relies on a security proce-
dure pursuant to which the authenticity of the message can be "tested" by
various devices which are designed to provide certainty that the message
is that of the sender identified in the payment order.209
Focusing on the commercial reasonableness of the security procedure
allows usage of banking standards and available technology to factor into
what is a commercially reasonable security procedure. It also allows the
relative sophistication of the payor and the payor bank's process to factor
into what is commercially reasonable for that payor.210 That inquiry should
be more predictable than an inquiry into whether either the payor or the
payor bank exercised ordinary care. What this rule does not do is place
much incentive on the payor to agree to use the procedure.
Thus perhaps the rule should more closely resemble the rule in Article
4A, that is, it should create an incentive on the payor bank to offer com-
mercially reasonable security procedures and an incentive on the payor to
agree to and use those commercially reasonable security procedures. Arti-
cle 4A encourages the payor to agree to the use of commercially reasonable
security procedures by deeming the security procedure the customer agrees
to use as commercially reasonable if the bank offers and the customer re-
fuses a commercially reasonable security procedure, and the customer
agrees to be bound by a payment order sent pursuant to the customer's
chosen security procedure. 211 If the customer will not agree to take on the
208. U.C.C. § 4A-202 (2005).
209. Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 1.
210. Article 4A defines a commercially reasonable security procedure as follows:
Commercial reasonableness of a security procedure is a question of law to be determined by
considering the wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the cus-
tomer known to the bank, including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally
issued by the customer to the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer,
and security procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated.
Id. § 4A-202(c).
211. Id. § 4A-202(c).
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liability from use of its chosen security procedure instead of the commer-
cially reasonable security procedure offered by the bank, the bank, in all
likelihood, will refuse to conduct funds transfers for the customer. As
stated in the official comments to Article 4A:
The purpose... is to encourage banks to institute reasonable safeguards
against fraud but not to make them insurers against fraud.... In most
cases, the mutual interest of bank and customer to protect against fraud
should lead to agreement to a security procedure which is commercially
reasonable. 212
To encourage both the payor and the payor bank to use commercially rea-
sonable security procedures, the rule proposed above could be restated as
follows:
A financial institution may debit a customer's account only if:
(a) the customer actually authorized the debit or is bound by the authori-
zation under the law of agency;
(b) the customer and the financial institution have agreed to use a com-
mercially reasonable security procedure to verify the authenticity of
the debit and the financial institution complied with the procedure to
authenticate the debit instruction; or
(c) the customer refused to agree to use a commercially reasonable secu-
rity procedure offered by the financial institution to verify the au-
thenticity of the debit instruction.
This rule also should operate to put incentives on the customer to
safeguard the means of complying with the security procedure. As stated in
the comments to Article 4A:
Breach of a commercially reasonable security procedure requires that the
person committing the fraud have knowledge of how the procedure
works and knowledge of codes, identifying devices, and the like. That
person may also need access to transmitting facilities through an access
device or other software in order to breach the security procedure.2
13
Unlike Article 4A, this proposed rule does not shift the loss to the
payor bank if the customer can prove that the means of breaching the secu-
rity procedure was obtained from a source other than the customer. 214 The
most likely source of the information to breach the security procedure,
other than the customer, is one controlled by the financial institution.215 If
that sort of exception applied, it would also encourage the financial institu-
tion to safeguard the information concerning the security procedure. Thus
the proposed rule could be altered as follows:
212. Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 4.
213. Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 5.
214. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
215. See id.
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(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a financial institution may debit
a customer's account only if:
(a) the customer actually authorized the debit or is bound by the au-
thorization under the law of agency;
(b) the customer and the financial institution have agreed to use a
commercially reasonable security procedure to verify the au-
thenticity of the debit and the financial institution complied with
the procedure to authenticate the debit instruction; or
(c) the customer refused to agree to use a commercially reasonable
security procedure offered by the financial institution to verify
the authenticity of the debit instruction.
(2) A financial institution may not debit its customer's account under
subsection (1)(b) if the information facilitating breach of the com-
mercially reasonable security procedure was not obtained directly or
indirectly from the customer.
This loss allocation scheme thus provides a clear, transparent, and
functional rule in which there are limited questions that must be resolved as
a matter of particular facts. The factual uncertainties would be whether the
debit was actually authorized or the customer was bound to the communi-
cation by agency law, whether the security procedure was commercially
reasonable, whether the bank complied with the security procedure, and
whether the wrongdoer obtained information used to breach the security
procedure from the purported payor.
Would this loss allocation rule work for the payment mechanisms that
are not currently Article 4A transactions, such as checks, pull (debit) funds
transfers, and consumer electronic funds transfers subject to the EFTA and
Regulation E?
Part of the challenge of adapting the Article 4A model to the current
payments environment is the psychological hurdle that requires an ac-
knowledgment that, just as with Article 4A payment orders, the processing
of debits against the payor's deposit account is conducted through auto-
mated systems without human involvement, regardless of the mechanism
used to initiate the debit. Payor banks do not routinely examine the signa-
ture of the drawer on checks to determine if the check is an authorized or-
der of the drawer. 216 Checks are processed by automated means using the
MICR line information. Electronic funds transfers from accounts through
point-of-sale purchases, ATMs, or other mechanisms are not examined to
determine if the consumer is in fact ordering the debit. Those funds-transfer
216. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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systems already depend upon algorithms or other security procedures such
as PIN numbers to determine some level of authenticity. 217
Another level of analysis must be to consider a policy choice in the
case of a consumer deposit account. The policy question is whether in re-
gard to a consumer transaction, the consumer should be charged with safe-
guarding the security procedure information. Under current Regulation E,
the consumer has no incentive (from a liability standpoint rather than an
inconvenience standpoint) to safeguard the access information. 218 Is this
the right policy choice? Does that perspective lead to an insufficient level
of caretaking to reduce the amount of loss from unauthorized transactions?
Once one acknowledges the automated and computer assisted pay-
ment processing environment when an instruction is presented to a payor
bank to debit an account and the need to reconsider the consumer protec-
tion policy for consumer accounts, then the remaining challenge is an op-
erational one. Can the payor bank institute the necessary processing
capability to offer commercially reasonable security procedures for all
types of mechanisms used to initiate debits from a deposit account? It is
easiest to imagine such security procedures being possible if the instruction
to debit an account is communicated electronically to the payor bank. In
that circumstance, it is a matter of programming to add information to the
electronic communication that would result in the ability to verify the
communication pursuant to a defined security procedure.
The old-fashioned paper check presents the hardest case for imagining
commercially reasonable security procedures that could be instituted to
verify the authenticity of the check as one issued by the drawer. 219 The
security procedure would have to consist of some coding added to the
check by the drawer at the time of issuance, not when the checks are pre-
printed with the payor bank's identifying code, the account number and
check number. That coding would have to be recognizable by the payor
217. See generally BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYS., A SUMMARY OF THE
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON THE RISK AND SECURITY INVOLVING RETAIL PAYMENTS OVER THE
INTERNET (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/intemetpayments/
default.htm.
218. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 205, supp. I, § 205.6, cmt. 6(b), note 2 (2007) ("consumer behavior that may
constitute negligence under state law, such as writing the PIN on a debit card or on a piece of paper kept
with the card, does not affect the consumer's liability for unauthorized transfers").
219. Although the check's demise has been oft predicted, and its use has been declining, it still
represents a significant percentage of the payments market. See Geoffrey R. Gerdes, Jack K. Walton II,
May X. Liu & Darrel W. Parke, Trends in the Use of Payment Instruments in the United States, FED.
RES. BULL., Spring 2005, at 180, 181 (although check usage declined from 2000 to 2003, checks still
represented the largest non-cash payment method); FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE 2007 FEDERAL
RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY: NONCASH PAYMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003-2006, at 5-9
(2007), available at http://www.frbservices.org/files/communications/pdf/research/2007-.payments.
study.pdf.
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bank's automated processing system. That coding would also have to be
something that would not be readily apparent to the payee or other parties
that may handle the check prior to the presentment to the payor bank; oth-
erwise, that coding information could be readily used to breach the security
procedure. Whether that type of coding is possible must be addressed be-
fore one would seek to apply this proposed rule to old-fashioned paper
checks.
220
If such coding was not possible and the proposed rule applied to all
payments except old-fashioned paper checks, payor banks perhaps would
price check services sufficiently to account for the losses from unauthor-
ized debits based upon an unauthorized drawer's signature. If the pricing
reflected the real degree of risk to the payor bank, perhaps this would con-
tinue the demise of the paper-based transaction.
CONCLUSION
As has been demonstrated, imagining rules that change the current
balkanized scheme of loss allocation due to unauthorized payments incep-
tions involves identifying the policies that are desired, crafting rules that
advance those policies, and then determining whether the implementation
of those policies is operationally possible given the current state of tech-
nology. This approach allows for a more instrumental mode of considering
payments mechanisms as tools to facilitate economic activity and allows a
more realistic methodology in structuring the costs of providing those
mechanisms.
220. One could imagine in a point-of-sale transaction where a check is used as a source document
to initiate an ACH transaction that the drawer would also have to input a PIN number (or other security
algorithm) that the merchant would not have access to. This would not work, however, if the check was
truncated at a point later than the point of sale.
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